Caris Life Sciences, Inc. [CAI] · Equity Underwriting Memo

Model Notes

WATCHLIST

Caris Life Sciences, Inc. [CAI] — Financial Model Notes

Phase Space Research · investment-memo v1.4.2 · Task 2 · 2026-07-28 Workbook: CAI_Model.xlsx — 6 tabs, live formulas throughout


Tabs

Tab Contents
Assumptions Market data, WACC build, operating drivers FY2023A–FY2031E, prior-period true-up row
Income Statement FY2023A–FY2031E, plus the earnings-quality memo block and the tie-out control
Balance Sheet FY2024A–FY2031E with a labelled forecast plug and a balance check
Cash Flow FY2026E–FY2031E, feeding closing cash back to the balance sheet
DCF Unlevered FCF, valuation bridge, 5×5 WACC × terminal-growth sensitivity
Scenarios & Comps Bear/Base/Bull, base-rate check, Gate 4 arithmetic, comparable companies

THE TIE-OUT (v1.4.2 rule — a model that balances but does not tie is confidently wrong)

The lesson from the inherited TWST model was that a zero balance check verifies internal consistency, not input accuracy. So every actual-year line here is reconciled to the filed statement, on the Income Statement tab, in a visible block — not asserted in prose.

Line Model Filed Delta
FY2025A revenue 812,033 812,033 (10-K) 0
FY2025A gross profit 539,168 $539.2m (8-K EX-99.1) 0
FY2025A operating income 45,113 45,113 (10-K) 0
FY2024A operating income (257,122) (257,122) (10-K) 0
FY2023A operating income (319,551) (319,551) (10-K) 0
FY2025A R&D 101,584 101,584 (10-K) 0
FY2025A S&M 167,506 167,506 (10-K) 0
FY2025A G&A 224,965 224,965 (10-K) 0

SUM OF ABSOLUTE TIE-OUT ERRORS = 0 (live formula, cell Income Statement!D43).

Cost of services is derived, not assumed: CostsAndExpenses − R&D − S&M − G&A. FY2025 = 766,920 − 494,055 = 272,865, giving gross profit 539,168 and a 66.4% gross margin — which reproduces the 8-K's stated $539.2m and 66% independently. Same construction reproduces FY2024's $178.8m and 43%.


Verification — how the model was actually checked

The skill requires reading back computed cells rather than trusting that Python wrote a formula string without erroring. Excel-via-AppleScript hung on a dialog, so verification used formulas 1.3.4, which parses the workbook and independently recalculates the entire formula dependency graph.

That verification found two real bugs, both of which would have shipped silently:

  1. Unit mismatch in the revenue build. Assumptions row 30 (molecular profiling revenue) is already in $000s — thousands of cases × dollars per case. The Income Statement multiplied it by 1,000 again, producing FY2026E revenue of $932,960 million. The balance check was unaffected. Caught only by reading the value.
  2. Three off-by-one row references on the Balance Sheet and Cash Flow, caused by blank spacer rows: Total current liabilities summed rows 17:18 instead of 16:17; TOTAL LIABILITIES started one row late; Closing cash summed 17+18 instead of 16+17. The balance check was −$30.5m in FY2026E and −$1,013.6m in FY2031E before the fix.

Post-fix read-back:

Control Value
Tie-out sum of absolute errors 0
Balance check, every forecast year 0.0000
FY2026E revenue $1,012,880k — inside the $1.00–1.02bn guide
FY2026E operating income $68,876k — implied by the company's own $590–595m opex guide
DCF value per share $13.26
Probability-weighted value $16.41

The read-back is not ceremonial. It is the only control that caught either bug.


Key modelling choices

Revenue is built bottom-up from volume × ASP, not from a growth rate. Molecular profiling revenue = clinical case volume × blended clinical ASP. This construction was validated exactly against Q3-2025 (50,763 cases × $4,089 = $207.57m vs $207.587m reported), which is also what makes the retired ASP disclosure recoverable.

The prior-period true-up is an explicit, separate row (Assumptions row 42), not buried in revenue:

FY2023 FY2024 FY2025 FY2026E FY2027E FY2028E FY2029E FY2030E FY2031E
True-up ($000s) (1,900) 3,900 33,600 20,000 12,000 8,000 6,000 5,000 5,000
Source filed filed filed est. est. est. est. est. est.

FY2023–FY2025 are the filed 10-K figures. Forecast years are house estimates and are labelled as such: Q1-2026 alone booked $10.3m, so FY2026E of $20m assumes the run-rate roughly halves through the year, then normalises toward a ~$5m steady state as the payer mix matures. This row drives the memo block showing operating income and gross margin ex true-up.

Zero cash taxes across the whole forecast. A $2,548.7m accumulated deficit with a full valuation allowance; FY2023/24/25 income tax expense was $0 in each year. This is worth real money in the DCF and is not an aggressive assumption — it is the filed position.

Stock-based compensation is NOT added back to free cash flow. At 7.5% of FY2026E revenue it is a real cost of employing this workforce. Adding it back would overstate DCF value by roughly $2.20/share.

WACC 11.52% — beta 1.39 measured over 277 daily observations against SPY since the IPO (the full available history), risk-free 4.70% (the same 3M T-bill rate as the book's cash hurdle, so the hurdle and the discount rate are consistent), ERP 5.0%, pre-tax cost of debt 10.0% post the Q1-2026 refinancing with no tax shield because of the valuation allowance. FY2025 cash interest was $44.0m on ~$378m ≈ 11.6%, so 10.0% reflects the refinancing rather than history.

The Balance Sheet forecast plug is labelled, not hidden. Row 22 (Other long-term liabilities) is a residual in forecast years so the sheet balances by construction; FY2024A and FY2025A are the filed figures. The plug's size as a percentage of total assets is displayed on row 36 so it can be seen rather than discovered.

Terminal value is 75.2% of DCF enterprise value. High, and disclosed rather than smoothed. It is why the DCF carries less weight in the final verdict than the scenario analysis — the same treatment applied to GH and TWST.


Scenario construction and the base-rate check

Bear (30%) Base (50%) Bull (20%)
FY2026E revenue $985m $1,010m $1,020m
FY2027–31 CAGR 9.0% 15.5% 23.5%
FY2031E revenue $1,516m $2,076m $2,930m
FY2031E operating margin 6.0% 16.5% 24.0%
Exit EV/revenue 2.0x 3.6x 5.5x
implied exit EV/EBIT 33.3x 21.8x 22.9x
PV/share $6.53 $15.70 $33.01

Base rate (Chan, Karceski & Lakonishok 2003 — growth persistence beyond chance is near-nonexistent). The Base 15.5% five-year CAGR from a ~$1bn base is roughly top-quartile, not top-decile. That is deliberate: Caris grew 97% in FY2025 and guides 23–26% for FY2026, so the Base already assumes sharp deceleration rather than extrapolating the recent rate — which is the modal modelling error the literature identifies.

The Bull 23.5% CAGR IS a top-decile outcome at this revenue scale and is named as such. It additionally requires Caris Detect — launched 2026-07-01, unreimbursed — to reach scale. It carries 20%.

Exit multiples are cross-checked on earnings rather than left as bare revenue multiples. The Base 3.6x revenue equals 21.8x EBIT for a mid-teens grower, which is fair rather than punitive — and it is below the 3.9x FY2026E multiple at which CAI trades today. This matters for calibration item B8: on this name the rejection is demonstrably not an artefact of a conservative exit multiple.


What the model does not do